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Abstract
A major issue in the current economic debate is related to the striking difference between
Europe, Japan and US concerning  the level and evolution of unemployment. This paper
explores the micro determinants of these observed stylized facts. In a first part, a
theoretical framework is presented allowing to address this comparative analysis. The
starting point is the definition of different micro-institutional settings encompassing: (i)
the structure of the firm; (ii) the system of education or vocational training; (iii) the
nature of the labor market. In particular, the notion of "mode of organization" of the firm
will be defined. In a second part, a model is proposed which takes up a "radical
economics" perspective to analyze the choice made by firms about wage and effort,
subject to their "mode of organization". The main results point to the crucial role played
by the mode of organization of the firm and the nature of workers' competence as key-
determinants of the different observable levels of the unemployment rate across main
developed countries.
Zusammenfassung
In den aktuellen wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Diskussionen spielt der unübersehbare
Unterschied zwischen Europa, Japan und den USA bei Höhe und Entwicklungsdynamik
der Arbeitslosigkeit eine wichtige Rolle. In diesem Beitrag werden die Mikro-
Determinanten der in wenige Kernaussagen und Eckdaten zusammengefaßten
empirischen Beoabachtungen analysiert.
Im ersten Teil wird der theoretische Rahmen dargelegt, in den die vergleichende Analyse
eingebettet ist. Zu Beginn werden die genauen institutionellen Funktionsweisen bezogen
auf Unternehmensstruktur, das System von Ausbildung und beruflicher Bildung und die
Verfaßtheit des Arbeitsmarkts definiert. Dabei geht es vor allem darum, das dieser Studie
zugrundeliegende Verständnis für die Spezifika der Verfaßtheit von Unternehmen
darzulegen. Im zweiten Teil wird ein ökonometrisches Modell vorgeschlagen, das von
dem Blickwinkel der „radical economics“ ausgeht. Mit ihm wird die Interdependenz
analysiert zwischen der jeweils spezifischen Verfaßtheit eines Unternehmens und seinen
Entscheidungen zur Gestaltung des Entlohnungssystems und der Leistungskontrolle der
Arbeitnehmer durch das Management.
Die zentralen Ergebnisse dieser Studie weisen auf die entscheidende Rolle hin, die den
Spezifika einer Unternehmensverfaßtheit ebenso zukommt wie dem  Ausbildungsstand
und dem Einbeziehen der Arbeitnehmer in die betrieblichen Abläufe. Sie sind
Schlüsseldeterminanten bei der Erklärung der unterschiedlichen Höhe der Arbeits-
losigkeit in den großen Volkwirtschaften.
Abstract. A major issue in the current economic debate is related to
the striking difference between Europe, Japan and US concerning  the
level and evolution of unemployment. This paper explores the micro
determinants of these observed stylized facts. In a first part, a
theoretical framework is presented allowing to address this
comparative analysis. The starting point is the definition of different
micro-institutional settings encompassing: (i) the structure of the firm;
(ii) the system of education or vocational training; (iii) the nature of
the labor market. In particular, the notion of "mode of organization"
of the firm will be defined. In a second part, a model is proposed
which takes up a "radical economics" perspective to analyze the
choice made by firms about wage and effort, subject to their "mode of
organization". The main results point to the crucial role played by the
mode of organization of the firm and the nature of workers'
competence as key-determinants of the different observable levels of
the unemployment rate across main developed countries.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers J4,
J6, L2.
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11. Introduction
A major puzzle in current economic debate stems from the
differences in observed rates of unemployment across developed
countries. Economic analysis has generally focused on divergence in
labor markets' organization (and flexibility) as the most plausible
institutional explanation of this phenomenon.
In the present work, I will propose a theoretical framework to
address this comparative analysis, that is based on the definition of a
wider micro-institutional setting encompassing: (i) the structure of the
firm; (ii) the system of education or vocational training; (iii) the
nature of the labor market. In particular, the notion of "mode of
organization" of the firm will be developed as a starting point of the
analysis.
Building on a stylization of different institutional
configurations, I propose a model that formalizes the choice of firms
about employment and wages, given the institutional constraints.
Following an approach proposed by the radical American economists
(Bowles, 1985), the unemployment/wage equilibrium is derived
through the definition of an optimal incentive scheme for the firm.
This implies addressing two related trades-off shaping firms’
choice -threat versus positive incentives, and internal versus external
discipline- whose resolution eventually will lead to the definition of
the equilibrium configuration of wage and “opportunity rate” (see
infra). Final equilibrium, including the unemployment and vacancy
rates, is then obtained by imposing the equality of in- and out-flows
from the unemployment pool. This is done through an endogenous
determination of both the separation and job finding rates. In
particular, I show that the equilibrium configuration of wage,
unemployment rate and vacancy rate turns out to be affected by the
nature of the micro-institutional setting (as defined above). This allows
me to account for differences in the equilibrium rate of unemployment
among developed countries.
2In fact, by distinguishing on the basis of the nature of both
firms' organization and the vocational training system, it is possible to
identify a micro-institutional stylization respectively characterizing
French, German, Japanese and US real institutional models. Results
concerning the equilibrium rate of unemployment in a given micro-
institutional setting can therefore be directly related to the originating
institutional model. This allows a tentative ranking of different micro-
institutional settings (and corresponding institutional models) as
regards their sustainable employment performance (1).
Compared to previous studies (Gatti, 1997), this approach allows
a widening of the scope of our cross-country comparison, progressing
from the Japan-US models opposition to the analysis of a larger set of
countries. Moreover, the model allows the determination of both the
unemployment rate and vacancy rate, thus partially contributing to the
current debate on cross-country differences in Beveridge curves.
The paper is organized as follows: first I present a theoretical
framework based on the notion of "mode of organization". Second, I
model the choice of the firm concerning its system of control upon
effort, where a central role is played by the nature and shape of the
prevailing institutional setting. Then, I focus more directly on the
determination of the wage/opportunity equilibrium configuration.
Finally, I derive the flow equilibrium condition for unemployment and
vacancy and show that the equilibrium rate of unemployment is
strongly affected by micro-institutional settings.
2.
 The micro-institutional setting
Micro-institutional setting will be characterized in the following
according to three different dimensions: (i) the structure of the firm;
(ii) the system of education or vocational training; (iii) the nature of
labor market. Here I will take up the first two aspects; I will deal with
the third one later, when treating issues of effort and workers’ mobility
(paragraph 3.1, infra).
3Let me start by point (ii). As far as training and competence are
concerned, I will take up the traditional distinction (first proposed by
Becker, 1962) between general and specific training. Unlike most
theoretical speculations about economic consequences of different
typologies of training, what I am interested in is the relationship
between nature of training and workers' external mobility. This is a
crucial factor -also shaping the operation of labor markets- that has
been given little attention in recent theoretical and empirical works (2).
In what follows, competence will be supposed to range from
firm-specific to generic (3). Firm-specific competence will be
associated with a reduced or absent external transferability, in the
sense that firm-specific workers will not regard themselves as being
able to find comparable employment conditions elsewhere. The
contrary holds for workers with generic competence.
Let the variable l grasps the (average) degree of competence’s
transferability characterizing the labor force (i.e., the proportion of
firm-specific workers inside the labor force). The parameter l therefore
grasps the prevailing nature of workers’ competence in a given
institutional context. The nature of workers’ competence is in turn
determined by the character of the vocational training system. We can
therefore propose a (tentative) cross-country ranking of the value taken
by l following existing literature and comparative studies on vocational
training systems and competence formation.
Following Soskice and Hancké (Soskice-Hancké, 1997) we first
have to single out institutional contexts where vocational training
systems deliver generally accepted diploma (as in Germany). In this
case, in fact, workers acquire competence that are more likely to be
transferable -namely, through those diploma. In institutional contexts
where this is not possible (namely, the US, Japan and to a less extent
France), transfer of competence is more difficult and mostly depends
on the actual contents of training.
4Then, it is well known that: “it is characteristic of internal
labor markets that skills are attributed to the individual company...”
(Kristensen, 1996). We can also observe that: “for very different
reasons and in highly different institutional contexts, such a situation
seems primarily to have existed in the US and Japan” (Kristensen,
1996). Finally, we should consider the extremely high level of human
capital specificity in Japan (Aoki, 1994), the role of German
apprenticeship system in dramatically reducing this specificity and the
quite general nature of French training (Maurice, 1993; Marsden,
1990). To sum up, we can finally assume (4):
l(Jap) > l(US) > l(Fr) > l(Ger).
We can go back now to point i) concerning a comparative
analysis of firms’ organizational structures. I will tackle this issue
proposing the notion of "mode of organization" (5). A mode of
organization (MoO) is a complex system of rules that should provide
the firm with an answer to the following questions:
a) how to control work intensity and effort;
b) how to manage information and communication flows.
This can be done through the definition of a specific system of
work organization and knowledge distribution inside the firm. These
two aspects of firms’ internal organization are actually tightly linked
together (see infra). Therefore, we can tentatively define two opposite
MoO: a centralized MoO that will consist of a hierarchical work
organization and a concentrated knowledge; and a decentralized MoO
that will be characterized by an horizontal work organization and a
shared knowledge. Let me quickly define these different configurations
taken respectively by work organization and knowledge distribution.
Concerning work organization, I mentioned two polar solutions,
namely hierarchical vs. horizontal organization of work. In the former
case, the "communication network" inside the firm is vertically
oriented: central authority is in charge of all kinds of decisions and
5guarantees internal coordination. The reverse holds when work
organization is horizontal: in this case, decision-making is a matter of
individual workers’ choices and decentralized coordination. The same
reasoning holds regarding knowledge distribution. Opposition here is
between a concentrated vs. shared distribution of knowledge. In the
former case, the stock of knowledge owned by the firm is concentrated
at the central authority (or experts) level. Workers do not share firm's
knowledge stock and their competence is determined outside the firm
(see Aoki, 1986). Conversely, when knowledge is shared, the know-
how is spread all around the firm through a process that I will call
“involvement”.
Indeed, a hierarchical (horizontal) organization of work is likely
to be (and in real cases actually is) associated to a concentrated
(shared) distribution of knowledge. Therefore, combining these two
factors actually leads to the previous definition of two opposite MoOs:
a centralized MoO with a hierarchical work organization and a
concentrated knowledge; and a decentralized MoO with an horizontal
work organization and a shared knowledge base. An extensive
literature is now available concerning the prevailing nature of firms’
MoO across different countries: it is a commonly shared view between
scholars that Japanese and German firms mostly present the main
characteristics of a decentralized mode of organization, while US and
French firms prevalently show features of a centralized MoO.
If we consider simultaneously the typologies respectively
proposed for vocational training systems and the MoO, we can describe
different micro-institutional settings by their position along two axes:
the “nature of competence axis” (from firm-specific to generic
competence), and the “mode of organization axis” (from centralized to
decentralized MoO). In figure 1 below, I propose a tentative
application of this sort of exercise, representing the different micro-
institutional settings prevailing in developed countries such as the
United States, Germany, France and Japan.
6Vocational training system
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Figure 1
In the following sections, I will explore how the institutional
features presented above influence the choice made by firms about
their incentive scheme and eventually affect the equilibrium
unemployment rate. I will first present the general setup of the model
and then solve it alternatively under the different parametric
assumptions characterizing each of the previous micro-institutional
settings.
3. The model
Let me consider the decision problem faced by firms when
determining the optimal level of production and wage. This generally
consists in maximizing profits, that is (6):
p  = profit = Q - (w + s) × Lp, (1)
where: Q = quantity produced; w = real wage; Lp = hours of work
hired; s = real cost of supervising resources per hour of work.
The introduction of s allows me to consider the twofold role
played by the authority respectively in the domain of coordination
between production units and control upon work intensity:
s = ts + m,
7where: ts = coordination cost per hour of work; m = monitoring cost
per hour of work.
The production function is:
Q =  h × F(e × Lp), h £  1, (2)
where: h = coordination efficiency; e = effort per hour of work.
Contrary to other models, in this framework workers' effort and
ability to coordinate are both determined by the nature and efficiency
of implemented incentive schemes; and the nature of this incentive
scheme is conditioned by firms’ organizational structure. Let me
clarify this point, by modeling explicitly effort and coordination
functions.
3.1 Labor market and the effort function
As far as work intensity is concerned, firms want to make sure
that workers provide a satisfactory level of effort. Given the conflicting
nature of labor/capital relationship, it is then necessary to implement
some devices in order to guarantee a positive level of effort.
In this respect, I will take up an efficiency wage approach and
namely the framework developed by the American radical economists
(see Bowles, 1985). In particular, Bowles states that effort can be
increased in two different ways:
- increasing the "direct monitoring" over workers (m);
- increasing the "cost of job loss" (wc) for every worker.
We can therefore propose a general specification of the effort
function such as the following (7):
e = effort per hour of labor hired = e(wc , m), (3)
with ¶ e / ¶ wc > 0, ¶ e / ¶ m > 0.
Following Bowles, we can define the "cost of job loss" as the
income loss that workers incur when they loose their jobs. Conditional
to the fact that they are fired, we can model workers’ income loss as
the difference between wage (w) and alternative expected income (wd):
cost of job loss = wc = w - wd, (4)
8where: w = wage; wd = alternative income in case of firing.
The expression for wd is given by the average between the
alternative wage that workers can earn if re-hired, and the
unemployment benefits they get if they do not find new jobs. The
average is calculated on the basis of the probability that workers have
to find new jobs (when they are fired). This depends on:
- the nature of workers’ competence (l);
- the global availability of jobs opportunities.
Let me define a variable p called the opportunity rate. This
variable is supposed to grasp global available opportunities for
workers. I will assume:
p = p(u,v), such that 0 < p < 1,
where: u = unemployment rate; v = vacancy rate.
The unemployment/vacancy rates are supposed to grasp the
global availability of job opportunities inside the economic system. The
higher (lower) the unemployment (vacancy) rate, the fewer the
alternative job opportunities globally available. However, it should be
considered that workers who have firm-specific competence will hardly
find (if fired) new jobs comparable to the original ones. Let me
develop this point.
I have assumed that firm-specific workers are in a proportion of
l inside the labor-force: these workers are given not transferable
competence. This means that these workers will be able to find new
jobs only if an “institution” exists which reconverts their competence.
In the present model, no such an institution is explicitly taken into
account. However, we can consider that the process of knowledge
sharing inside the firm could carry on the same function, by re-shaping
workers' competence. Since knowledge sharing only occurs inside
decentralized firms (where the knowledge base gets shared among
workers), only decentralized firms can provide “bad” workers with a
new adequate competence (8). On the other side, the (1-l) generic
9workers always have a real chance to find new jobs similar to the ones
they had before being fired (i.e., earning the same wage).
We can sum up now the operation of matching process (for fired
workers) on the labor market. Fired workers will find new job
opportunities with a probability given by the (aggregate) opportunity
rate, but only generic workers (in a proportion of 1-l inside the labor
force) eventually will have a chance to find a good match. Firm-
specific workers (in a proportion of l) will end up with an unsuccessful
match whose outcome eventually will depend on the MoO of firms.
This process can be represented as in figure 2.
Fired
workers
p
1-l
 l
  1-p
  Unemployment
Successful
match
?
Figure 2
According to the above analysis, the (?) outcome is meant to
represent the “unsuccessful match” either allowing workers to find a
new job with a lower wage than before (when firms are decentralized),
or leading them to unemployment (when firms are centralized). This
implies that labor market operation actually changes in relation to the
nature of vocational training system and MoO of the firm. As Aoki
puts it: "there may be a close connection between labor market
characteristics and the information systematic characteristic of the
firm from a comparative perspective" (Aoki, 1985).
In case of successful matches, workers find a new job which fits
their competence; then they are paid a wage (wv) that will be equal
(ex-post) to their previous one. When an unsuccessful match occurs,
10
workers find a job that does not fit their competence and they will
receive a lower (minimum) wage ( w ). In other words, the labor market
has a dual structure with an "upper" level (corresponding to core
firms) where workers are paid a market wage and a "lower" level
(corresponding to peripheral firms) where workers are paid an
exogenous minimum wage (9).
From figure 2 above we can deduce the expression for the
(average) alternative income (wd) corresponding to workers employed
in a system populated, respectively, by decentralized (D) or centralized
firms (C) (10):
wd (D) = p(1-l) wv + p l w + (1-p) w , (5)
wd (C) = p(1-l) wv + (1-p(1-l)) w , (6)
where: wv = alternative market wage; w = minimum wage;
w  = unemployment benefits.
Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) we can easily obtain the
definition of the cost of job loss in the two cases. Therefore, we have
completely defined the first control device that firms can implement to
obtain a positive level of effort.
The second control device is direct monitoring, consisting in
actively supervising workers' behavior on the job. In this respect, one
crucial difference between centralized and decentralized MoO concerns
the role played by central authority in the coordination process. In fact,
in a centralized firm, supervising resources have to be used for two
different functions:
- direct monitoring (m);
- coordination between production units (ts);
while in a decentralized firm workers are capable to coordinate
autonomously.
Therefore, we can sum up our claim as follows:
centralized MoO Þ ts > 0 Þ  m = s - ts ,
decentralized MoO Þ ts = 0 Þ s = m .
11
3.2 Coordination and knowledge sharing
In this section I analyze how the coordination function (h) can
be specified according to the nature of firms’ MoO. Let me start with
the common assumption that a given amount of communication per
hour of work (t) is needed inside the firm to assure coordination and
avoid wasting (potential) output (11). We can write:
h = h(t), ¶ h / ¶ t > 0. (7)
Two options are then possible (corresponding to different MoO):
i) centralized mode of organization. The MoO is characterized by a
vertical organization of work and concentrated knowledge;
coordination is therefore assured by hierarchy (t = ts). This allows to
fully exploit the specialization of tasks. Therefore, we can put: h(ts)
= 1, adding a cost (ts × Lp) to production costs;
ii) decentralized mode of organization. MoO relies on decentralized
coordination among workers implemented through a process of
knowledge sharing. Intensity of this knowledge sharing can be
(partially) determined by choosing the amount of “socialization
activities” (that is, team work, quality circles...) undertaken. Let me
define:
t = td = amount of socialization activities per hour of work;
h(td) = decentralized coordination ability,  h < 1.
Therefore, firms can choose the optimal degree of
decentralization taking into consideration that, in order to further
socialization activities, supervision is always needed. This means that
part of firm's monitoring resources must be diverted from direct
control upon production effort. In particular, I will assume that a
proportion (td × m d ) of the firm’s monitoring resources (m) are necessary
in order to obtain a degree of coordination h(td). Therefore, we have:
mp = monitoring upon production effort =  m - td × m
d
.
The firm has to choose an optimal amount of td deciding the
appropriate allocation of monitoring resources among control and
12
socialization. To do this, each firm solves the following maximization
problem:
Max Q = h(td) × e(wc ; m - td × m d ) × Lp.
td
In order to obtain explicit results, let me propose the following
specifications for coordination and effort functions (12):
h(td) = td e ; (8)
e(wc ; mp) = e[(wc)a × (mp)b]  = e[(wc)a × (m - td × m d )b] . (9)
Solution to the maximization problem is given by:
¶ Q/ ¶ td = 0,
which means:
e × td
( e -1)
× (m - td × m d )b - td e × b × (m - td × m d )(b-1) × m d  = 0.
Then we obtain:
td = [ e  / ( e  + b)] × [1 / m( d -1)],
and:
h(td) = [ e /( e  + b)] e × [1/m e ( d -1)]. (10)
Therefore, if d  > 1 (13) the process of knowledge sharing
determines a negative feed-back of monitoring on coordination. The
coefficient of monitoring in the production function now turns out to
be:
b ¢  = b - e × ( d  -1) < b.
This result is coherent with reported stylized facts about
workers' behavior in Japanese firms (a typical example of
decentralized MoO). In fact, the activities by which workers get to
share their knowledge are generally of an informal nature, in the sense
that they are not performed under explicit control by an authority.
Quoting Okuno: "a senior worker frequently helps junior workers in
the same work line learn special skills needed for the job ..... Yet on-
the-job-training is not assigned as a part of senior worker's job, nor
does he receive any extra reward for his efforts"  (Okuno, 1984).
These activities are therefore more likely to be observed when direct
control is absent or reduced. As Marsden observes: "under the low
13
trust conditions which prevail in many firms, which are encouraged by
tight managerial control, and an insistence on contractual obligations,
workers have little incentive to share this information.....if anything
they have every incentive to use it to make their own job easier"
(Marsden, 1996).
I will sum up the assumptions that I make concerning MoO
parametric specification in the following table:
Table I
A parametric characterization of the MoOs
Mode of Organization
Centralized Decentralized
Knowledge distribution h
 = 1 h = h(m), h ¢ <0
Work organization t > 0
(s = m + t)
t
 = 0
(s = m)
3.3 Choice of an optimal incentive scheme
Let me now turn to the solution of firms’ maximization problem.
First, the firm has to determine the optimal combination of direct
monitoring and cost of job loss in order to obtain a given level of
effort. Once this combination determined, the firm has to find the
optimal level of wage. As we have seen (Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)), firm's
profits and production function are:
p  = Q - (w + s) × Lp,  with  Q =  h × F(e × Lp).
I will assume that the production function shows constant return
to scale on labor: this does not constitute a major assumption and
makes the following analysis much clearer. Moreover, I will assume
that the effort function has the same specification as in (9):
e = wc
a
× m
b
.
The coordination function h is defined as in the previous
section: in a centralized MoO (C), coordination is perfectly assured by
hierarchy (h=1), while in a decentralized MoO (D) coordination is also
14
decentralized and eventually will depend on the amount of monitoring
resources (as in Eq. (10)):
h(C) = 1,
h(D) = [ e /( e  + b)] e × [1/m e ( d -1)].
Finally, I make standard assumptions about coefficients a and b:
0 < a < 1 , 0 < b < 1,
in order to guarantee concavity of e(wc , m) in its arguments.
Maximization stands as follows:
Max p  = h × e × Lp - (w + s) × Lp , (11)
m,w,Lp
Substituting respectively expressions (5) or (6) for the cost of job
loss into the profit function and considering the corresponding
definition of s given above (table 1), we can resolve (11) to obtain the
following first-order conditions:
¶ p / ¶ w = ¶ p / ¶ m Þ  ¶ e/ ¶ w = ¶ e/ ¶ m, (12i)
¶ p / ¶ Lp = 0 Þ  e = w + s, (12ii)
¶ p / ¶ w = 0 Þ  1/( ¶ e/ ¶ w) = 1. (12iii)
Condition (12i) gives the definition of the optimal relationship
between the two control devices (monitoring and cost of job loss):
m/wc = b/a. (13)
Substituting into the effort function (9) we obtain:
e* = (b/a)b (wc)a+b. (14)
This expression allows the determination of the level of effort as
a function of the cost of job loss (and therefore wage). In order to rule
out any possibility of perverse results due to increasing returns to scale
in the effort function, I will assume: a + b £  1.
In order to determine the equilibrium configurations of wages
and opportunity rates, I have to consider now the two remaining first-
order conditions.To do that, I will first combine conditions (12ii) and
(12iii) to obtain the wage curves associated to different MoO; then I
will impose the constancy of the cost of job loss at the equilibrium
(condition (12iii)).
15
3.4 Equilibrium wage/opportunities configurations
Combining conditions (12ii) and (12iii), resolving and
substituting (under the ex-post equilibrium assumption that w=wv) for
the definitions of the cost of job loss respectively corresponding to a
decentralized (D) and a centralized (C) firm, eventually we obtain the
following optimal wage curves:
w(C) = [ ][ ]
a t b p l w
p l b a
× + - × - × - ×
- × - × - -
( ) ( ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
, (15)
w(D) = [ ][ ]
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1
-
¢
× × × + - ×
- × - × - ¢ -
b p l w p w
p l b a
, (16)
where: b ¢  = b - e × ( d  -1) < b.
We can see from the above that both wage curves establish a
positive relationship between wage and the opportunity rate p(u,v).
Moreover, we can easily show that a maximum opportunity rate exists
that prevents wage explosion:
pmax = 1- a l bl b
- × -
- × -
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
. (17)
Two points are worth making concerning expression (17). First,
since b ¢  < b, the maximum opportunity rate associated to decentralized
firms is higher than the one associated to centralized firms. The reason
why this happens is that a lower value of the monitoring coefficient b
(as in decentralized firms) reduces the scope for the effort enhancing
mechanism relying on external discipline (i.e., linked to the threat of
being fired), thus allowing a higher opportunity rate to be compatible
with wage moderation.
Second, we can see from (17) that the maximum opportunity rate
is a decreasing function of the proportion of firm-specific workers (l).
This results from the role played by specificity of competence as an
alternative disciplinary device which replaces the external mechanism
relying on the unemployment and vacancy rates. Therefore, we can
easily show that:
pmax(Jap) > pmax(Ger), and:
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pmax(US) > pmax(Fr).
More generally, combining the above observations on the
relative values of coefficients b and l, and their effects on pmax, we can
show that:
pmax(D) > pmax(C)  if:
l(C) - l(D) < a × (b-b ¢ ) / [(1-b) × (1-b ¢ )]. (18)
According to the proposed ranking for l (section 2), that is:
l(Jap) > l(US) > l(Fr) > l(Ger),
condition (18) on pmax(D) is always satisfied for Japan (since in this
case l(D) > l(C)), while the result is uncertain for Germany. Since
l(US) > l(Fr), condition (18) for Germany is more easily verified
against France than against US, so that we can expect the following
tentative ranking to hold:
pmax(Jap) > pmax(US) > pmax(Ger) > pmax(Fr). (19)
Considering now condition (12iii) above leads to define a
complementary relationship between wage and opportunity rate, which
allows me to determine the equilibrium configuration for these two
variables. Condition (12iii) states that the cost of job loss has to be
constant at equilibrium. This condition can actually be rewritten as
follows:
( ¶ e/ ¶ w) = 1 Þ wc(I) = B (I),
where: I = D,C respectively indicates decentralized and centralized
MoO. Considering that B  values are:
B (D) = {(b ¢ /a)b ¢  (a+b ¢ ) [ e /( e  + b)] e } 1/(1-a-b ¢ ),
B (C) = {(b/a)b (a+b)} 1/(1-a-b),
we can show that the inequality B (D) < B (C) generally holds.
The condition above simply states that cost of job loss has to be
constant at equilibrium. Substituting the corresponding expression of
the cost of job loss for wc(I) into the above condition, we obtain the
following complementary positive relationships between wage and
opportunity rate:
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p D w w D
w w l w w
( ) ( )( ) ( )=
- -
- - × -
B
, (20)
p C w w C
l w w
( ) ( )( ) ( )=
- -
- × -
B
1
. (20 ¢ )
In order for the predicted value of p to be positive the following
condition must hold:
w > wmin = w  +  B (I),
stating that a minimum wage level exists (even assuming away
unemployment benefits). Actually, a maximum wage level also exists
corresponding to p=1. In this case, in fact:
w(D) = wmax(D) = w  + B (D)/l(D),
w(C) = wmax(C) = w  + B (C)/l(C).
The maximum wage level always increases when human capital
specificity (l) decreases (so it is higher for France compared to US, and
for Germany compared to Japan). We can also show that:
wmax(D) > wmax(C), if:
w - w  > { B (C) × l(D) - B (D) × l(C)} / l(C) × l(D).
For the above condition to hold we need: either l(D) to be very
low (i.e., Germany) or ( w - w) value to be sufficiently large. Therefore,
we can reasonably assume the condition to hold for Germany.
Concerning Japan, the above condition is more easily verified against
the US than against France (because l(US) > l(Fr)). Depending on this,
the final equilibrium configurations for centralized and decentralized
MoO are respectively defined considering both the wage curve and the
corresponding complementary relationship (20). The result is
illustrated below (figure 3): the picture shows both the wage curves as
well as the opportunity curves corresponding to the different micro-
institutional settings that have been singled out. On the horizontal axis
I consider the complement to one of the opportunity rate p: countries
showing higher equilibrium opportunity rates are therefore found
closer to the origin.
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4.
 Equilibrium unemployment
4.1
 The equilibrium level of the opportunity rate
Figure above shows different equilibrium configurations for the
opportunity rate p. Up until now we have retained a general
specification of the opportunity rate. However, we know that this rate
actually depends on unemployment and vacancy rates. Therefore, we
should also consider that the above result -concerning the equilibrium
opportunity rate- actually defines a first equilibrium relationship
between unemployment and vacancy:
p(u,v) = p*, (21)
with: ¶ u/ ¶ v >  0.
We will call this relationship the opportunity locus. In order to
simplify calculations, in the following I will assume the opportunity
rate to be characterized by a linear functional form such as:
p = v × (1-u). (22)
This is a minor (and reasonable) assumption that has the merit
to allow me to derive explicit results concerning the role of micro-
institutional settings on equilibrium unemployment rates.
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Given the above specification, we can easily see that the relative
position (in the (u,v) space) of the opportunity locus corresponding to
different micro-institutional settings actually depends on the optimal p
value derived in previous sections, that is:
p*(Jap) > p*(US) > p*(Ger) > p*(Fr).
In the following section, we derive the aggregate
unemployment/vacancy relationship implied by equilibrium flows
condition on the labor market, under the hypothesis of an endogenous
determination of both separation and job finding rates.
4.2 Flows equilibrium
In order to determine the equilibrium unemployment rate, we
have to consider a complementary relationship ensuring the
equilibrium on the labor market. Therefore, a flows' equilibrium
condition is required to impose equality of flows in and out the
unemployment pool. Let me define:
d = separation rate;  f = job finding rate.
The flows' equilibrium condition is then:
L × d = (N - L) × f,
where: L = employed people,  N = active population.
From this we obtain:
u = (N-L) / N = d / (d+f). (23)
Let me define now separation and job finding rates. Since all
workers are identical and have the same probability of finding a job
when entering the labor market (either for the first time or after being
fired), the job finding rate can actually be understood as the
probability of finding a new job (when fired). As we have seen (section
3.1), this probability is determined by the opportunity rate combined
with the degree of specificity of workers’ human capital. In particular,
the probability of finding a new job is different for a decentralized (D)
and a centralized (C) firm:
f(D) = p, (24)
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f(C) = p × (1-l), (24 ¢ )
Substituting (22) and (24) (or (24 ¢ )) for p into (23) we obtain
the following equilibrium conditions (14):
u × v = d for decentralized MoO, (25)
u × v = d/(1-l) for centralized MoO. (25 ¢ )
 Let me turn now to the definition of the separation rate. In my
model, separations from the firm occur only when a worker is
discovered not working. The probability of being discovered not
working is likely to be a function of the quantity of resources affected
to monitoring activities (15). I will define:
g  = probability of being discovered not working = g (m),
 such that:  g ¢  > 0,  g (0) = 0,  g ( µ ) = 1.
The separation rate is then:
d = separation rate = g (m), (26)
which is endogenously determined inside the model by the quantity of
resources affected to monitoring activities.
From (26), and considering that the optimal level of (m) is such
that (Eq. (13)):
m* = (b/a) × wc*, 
with (from condition (12iii)): 
wc*(I) = B (I), I = D or C, (27)
we can deduce that the equilibrium conditions (25) and (25 ¢ ) imply a
negative relationship between vacancy rate and unemployment rate:
u = u(v; b,l), ¶ u/ ¶ v <  0.
Building on this framework, the following section will present
explicit results for the model considering a particular functional
specification of the separation rate. In this way, it is possible to
interpret differences in the equilibrium rate of unemployment across
developed countries as a consequence of the varying nature of the
micro-institutional settings.
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4.3 The equilibrium rate of unemployment in varying micro-
institutional settings
Let me assume that the probability of being discovered not
working (and fired) is simply specified as follows:
g (m) = m/M, (28)
where M is an arbitrarily large constant.
Since d = g , we can substitute (28) for g  into conditions (25) and
(25 ¢ ). Considering the optimal level of direct monitoring (Eq. (13))
and of cost of job loss (Eq. (27)), we can easily obtain an explicit
formulation of conditions (25) establishing a negative relationship
between unemployment rate and vacancy rate. We finally get to the two
following unemployment/vacancy curves, respectively for a centralized
(C) and a decentralized (D) MoO:
u(C) = b C
a M v l
×
× × × -
B ( )
( )1 , (29)
u(D) = ¢ ×
× ×
b D
a M v
B ( )
. (30)
We can see from the equations above that the minimum
unemployment rate (corresponding to a vacancy rate value v = 1) is
such that:
umin(C) > umin(D),
because of assumptions about coefficient (b) characterizing the MoO
(section 3.2), and:
umin (US) > umin (Fr),
because of assumptions about relative values of workers’ human capital
specificity (section 2.).
Therefore, the relative position of u(v) curves crucially depends
on parameters identifying the different micro-institutional settings.
Combining Eq. (26) with the corresponding (Beveridge) curve allows
us to define the final equilibrium configuration for unemployment and
vacancy rates, respectively for a decentralized and a centralized MoO.
In the following, I present a simple graphical representation of the
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equilibrium unemployment/vacancy configuration across different
micro-institutional settings (figure 4).
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5.
 Conclusions
In this paper, I build on an efficiency wage framework to model
firms’ choice on wage and effort as an “institutionally-biased”
optimization. In order to do that, a stylization of different micro-
institutional settings is proposed and the notion of "mode of
organization" is introduced. This allows me to take into account the
influence of micro-institutional parameters on firms' behavior.
The proposed stylization deals with varying micro-institutional
settings across developed countries (namely France, Germany, Japan,
and the US) and interprets them as a consequence of two factors:
i) the nature of workers’ competence (the parameter l);
ii) the MoO of firms (the parameter b).
Based on this approach, I present a model combining an
efficiency wage determination of wage/opportunity equilibrium
configurations, and a flow equilibrium condition for unemployment
and vacancy rates. Results concerning the equilibrium
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unemployment/vacancy configurations are derived in the paper, which
point to a major role played by the mode of organization of firms and
the nature of workers' competence as key-determinants of cross-country
differences in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. These results
throw some lights on the structural causes underlying France high
unemployment experience and on possible determinants of Japan
exceptional employment performance.
More work is needed to incorporate into the model a stylization
of the micro-institutional settings characterizing other European
countries (such as Italy or Spain), which is indispensable to a better
understanding of the structural determinants of unemployment
throughout Europe. Moreover, an empirical evaluation of the actual
strength of provided results is also necessary.
The paper has of course some limitations, one of the main ones
being probably the static perspective adopted throughout the analysis.
Several features of the model could actually be turned into a dynamic
approach and this would lead us to study the very process of emergence
of a given micro-institutional setting.
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FOOTNOTES
                                                       
1
 This is actually a crucial point in our approach. Our concept of equilibrium rate
of unemployment is meant to grasp the sustainable level of unemployment inside
the economy, compatible with labor market equilibrium. It can easily be shown
(see Carlin-Soskice, 1990) that in an open economy framework the equilibrium
rate of unemployment actually defines a minimum sustainable rate of
unemployment while the actual rate is also determined by other factors (i.e.,
demand factors).
2
 For an interesting empirical work on British data, concerning the intensity of
labor mobility associated to different forms of apprenticeship, see Booth and
Satchell, 1996.
3
 The definition of “generic competence” encompasses both low, generic skills as
well as high, general skills. In different words, the distinction between skills’
quality will not be taken into account; I will focus only on the distinction in
competence’s nature.
4
 The same kind of ranking, based on an comparative analysis of individual countries
training systems, can be found in Hancké-Soskice, 1997. Inequalities given in the text
can actually be weakened (for example, considering only two groups of countries -high
vs. low firm-specific competence countries) without substantially changing our
argument. Strong inequalities are given just to simplify exposition.
5
 A more comprehensive analysis of the nature and characteristics of the mode of
organization of the firm can be found in Gatti, 1997.
6
 Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets, the relative product price P
has been directly assumed equal to 1.
7
 The specification of the effort function has a sociological justification relying on
the conflicting nature of the labor/capital relationship. Under the same assumption
Bowles (Bowles, 1985) obtains a similar specification considering explicitly
workers' utility maximization.
8
 This interpretation comes from the commonly shared view that initial
competence is not so crucial to a decentralized firms, whose priority is rather to
get workers accustomed with the internal “stock of knowledge” of the firm. The
opposite generally holds for the centralized firm to which competence is somehow
given from outside. In this case, initial competence actually matters and
determines the eligibility of a worker for a given job (see Aoki, 1994).
9
 We could easily consider the minimum wage as endogenously determined by the
employment level on the secondary market.
10
 The retained alternative income definition is derived under two crucial
assumptions: i) there is no distinction in nature of jobs offered by firms, and ii)
workers acquire their competence after being hired the first time: it is therefore
impossible for firms to make any distinction between specific and generic workers
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upon the first hiring. These assumptions are rather common ones in matching
models literature. In the present context, they allow me to define the alternative
income simply as an aggregate average.
11
 A similar approach is generally taken up in recent models of firm's organization
(see Greenan-Guellec, 1994).
12
 The specification taken up is a generalization of the functional form proposed by
Bowles and Boyer (1988).
13
 This is actually a standard hypotheses, being m d  a cost and therefore generally a
convex function.
14
 There is actually a second root which is always equal to 1; so I will not consider
it as a possible solution for the equilibrium unemployment rate.
15
 As Bowles points it out (Bowles, 1985), this probability also plays a role in the
definition of the effort function. In my model, this still holds but remains implicit
because I directly take up a “reduced form” of the effort function (see footnote 7).
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